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Abstract
The financial crisis and the Great Recession to which it gave rise exposed
the deep flaws in standard macro-economic models, and in the way those
models were deployed. In this paper, based on a talk given to the Turkish
Economic Association in November 2012, Joseph E. Stiglitz discusses the
range of these deficiencies and the ways in which the models must be re-
formed.
The paper first examines five particular issues in the current policy debate
and explains why the standard model provides a misguided framework for
addressing them. The paper identifies the fundamental flaws in the standard
model, and argues that in trying to fine tune the models for “normal” periods,
it failed to address the more profound question of how to explain deep down-
turns, including slow recoveries.
A central lacuna is the lack of attention to credit and the institutions pro-
viding it. It explains how a better understanding of banks would have led to
better ways to recapitalize the banking system than those employed in the
aftermath of the crisis. Finally, the paper relates all of these issues to the on-
going Euro crisis, showing in particular that the structure of the euro, though
seemingly designed to improve the efficiency of resource allocations, has
actually created an unstable and inefficient system.
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1. Introduction
No one would, or at least should, say that macro-economics has done well
in recent years.1 The standard models not only didn't predict the Great Reces-
sion, they said it couldn't happen—bubbles don't exist in well-functioning
economies of the kind assumed in the standard model. Not surprisingly, even
after the bubble broke, they didn't see the full consequences, and they haven't
provided good guidance to policymakers in responding to the crisis. A half
decade after the bursting of the bubble, US unemployment is still high—with
almost one out of six Americans who would like a full-time job not being able
to get one. The government is still financing almost all mortgages.
So, too, our standard models didn't predict the follow-on Euro crisis, nei-
ther its occurrence nor its evolution. The test of science is prediction—and
one should have some skepticism of a model that can't predict the two biggest
macro-events of the last 80 years. A model whose predictive ability is so weak
can hardly be relied upon for policy guidance.
In my Adam Smith lecture before the European Economic Association
(Stiglitz, 2011), I delineated what I thought were the major deficiencies in the
standard model, the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model, that
evolved out of the representative agent models popular in earlier years. As I
emphasized, it is fully appropriate for a macro-economic model to be dy-
namic, to be stochastic, and to aim for general equilibrium. And any model is
a simplification of reality, so it is not a criticism that many things are not in-
cluded in the model.
The model is, however, rightly criticized for leaving out several aspects of
the economy that are central to understanding economic performance in these
crises, for making behavioral assumptions that are questionable at best, and
for focusing excessive attention on certain aspects of economic behavior that
are not central to short-run macro-economic performance.
My talk this afternoon has five sections. The first four are devoted to dis-
cussing the general deficiencies in the model, particularly as they apply to
understanding this crisis. This should provide guidance to thinking about how
macro-economics can and should be reformed. Section 2 looks at five par-
ticular issues in the current policy debate and explains why the standard
model either does not address them, or provides a framework for addressing
                                                     
1 It is striking that Edward C. Prescott once alleged that this is the “golden age of economics.”
(See his April 2006 lecture at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, available at
http://www.trinity.edu/nobel/Prescott/Prescott_Webquotes.htm (accessed June 12, 2013).
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them that is misguided. Section 3 focuses more narrowly on the deficiencies
in the currently fashionable standard model, largely from a theoretical per-
spective. Section 4 suggests that part of these deficiencies arises from the fact
that it has focused on the wrong question; it suggests the questions it should
have focused upon. The fifth section looks at one issue in particular that was
central to the policy debates four years ago: the best way to recapitalize the
banking system.
In the last part of this paper, I focus more narrowly on the issue of the day,
the Euro crisis.
2. What's Wrong with Current Macro-economics
Before turning to a more general theoretical discussion of the deficiencies
in the standard model, I want to discuss five key issues that have become part
of recent policy debates.
Current Policy Debates
A. The Multiplier2
There has been considerable discussion of the magnitude of the multiplier
associated with government spending, with critics of expansionary govern-
ment spending suggesting that it is low, zero, or even negative. They look at
the experience of different countries over long time periods. Such analyses
should be an important warning of the foolishness of mindless regressions. Of
course, when the economy is at or near full employment, the multiplier (cor-
rectly measured) will be low. Even then, measurement problems (GDP is not
a good measure of economic output, providing only a biased estimate of eco-
nomic performance when the share of government expenditure increases.3)
and econometric problems bedevil such analyses. But the question is, what
will the multiplier be when there is a high level of unemployment and large
underutilization of capacity? Since we have not had the levels of unemploy-
ment and capacity utilization that we are now experiencing since the Great
Depression of the 1930s—and the structure of the economy was markedly
different during the Great Depression than now—there is no way we can, with
confidence, extrapolate the experiences of previous post- Depression down-
turns to the current situation.
                                                     
2 For a discussion of some of the issues raised here, see Solow (2012).
3 See Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2010).
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Economic theory, though, provides a compelling framework for analysis.
The problem is lack of aggregate demand. Government spending increases
aggregate demand. We can identify leakages (from savings and imports) and,
on the basis of that, calculate the multiplier. Traditional analyses, based on
downturns of short duration, focused on one-period multipliers: two years
from now, the thinking went, the economy would presumably be back to full
employment, and the multiplier would be zero. But this downturn is long
term, so in calculating the multiplier, we should calculate the impacts not just
for this period, but for subsequent periods as well.
For the United States, this kind of analysis yields a multi-period multiplier
(with reasonable values of savings and import coefficients) in the range of 1.5
to 2.
The next question is: are there reasons to believe that there are reactions
from market participants that will amplify or reduce these effects, i.e., are
there "crowding in" or "crowding out" effects? Again, in normal periods, the
Central Bank, worried about an overheated economy, raises interest rates and
tightens credit, discouraging investment. The result is that government
spending crowds out private investment. But now, the Fed is committed to
keeping interest rates low and doing what it can to increase the availability of
credit. This explains again both why estimates of the multiplier based on nor-
mal periods are irrelevant, and why, in this case, the multiplier will not be
reduced by crowding out of investment. There may, in fact, be crowding in of
investment—if government spending, for instance, goes to public investment,
and public investment is complementary to private investment. Alexander
Field (2011), for instance, makes a persuasive case for the theory that infra-
structure investment during the Depression enhanced private-sector produc-
tivity, and that this helped lay the foundations for strong growth after World
War II.
Barro-Ricardo, reasoning similarly, suggests that the increased indebted-
ness of government will lead to more savings (to offset future tax liabilities).
There is little evidence of such an effect in recent years; in fact, the Bush tax
cuts gave rise to soaring deficits, which were followed by savings falling to
near zero.4 To believe in the Barro-Ricardo model, one would have to hy-
pothesize that in the absence of the tax cut, savings would have been mark-
edly negative.
                                                     
4 The St. Louis Fed tracks personal savings rate on its website at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/PSAVERT.txt (accessed October 31, 2012); the
historically low personal savings rates during the Bush years are clear here. See also Delli
Gatti et al. (2012a and 2012b).
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The criticisms of the hypothesis are well known: it ignores capital con-
straints and distributive effects. Indeed, there may even be "crowding in" of
consumption. First, if government spending is for high-return investment, in a
period such as the current one where government can borrow at a negative
real interest rate, the government's balance sheet will be improved; thus (in
the world of rationality, in which taxpayers see through the public veil), sav-
ings would be reduced.5 Moreover, if, as we have already noted is the case
now, the downturn is likely to extend for several periods, some of today's
savings will be for future consumption; with rational expectations, individuals
would then know that incomes in future periods will be higher than they oth-
erwise would have been, meaning that their lifetime budget constraint has
moved out. This leads to increased consumption today (Neary and Stiglitz,
1983).
Of course, a good multiplier analysis takes into account the fact that differ-
ent kinds of expenditures have different multipliers. What matters is not what
the average multiplier has been in the past, but the effect of a well-designed
expansionary policy today. We have suggested that spending on investments
in the US today on education or research has a far higher multiplier, say, than
on contractors in Iraq. (Stiglitz, 2010c)
For some highly indebted countries, the additional borrowing to finance
expansionary investment oriented fiscal policy would come at a high price;
they would have to pay increasingly higher interest rates, which might con-
strain what they could spend overall on output-expanding projects.6 In princi-
ple, the market should realize this, in which case the greater indebtedness
could lead to a lowering of interest rates. But there is no shortage of evidence
of market irrationality; and whether justified or not, if increased indebtedness
leads to higher interest rates, governments may have to employ another strat-
egy, making use of the balanced-budget multiplier.
Traditional analyses suggested that the balanced-budget multiplier is unity.
But well-designed increases in taxes and expenditures can have a balanced-
                                                     
5 Government expenditures do not even have to be investments: if government consumption
expenditures and private consumption expenditures are complements, then there will be
crowding in of consumption. Moreover, there is another channel through which crowding in
of investment, to which we already alluded, takes place:  when government investment and
private investment are complements.
6 Rogoff and Reinhardt (2010) suggested, furthermore, that increased indebtedness beyond a
90 per cent debt GDP ratio would lead to significantly lower growth.  Putting aside the fact
that their analyses ignored the central point we have emphasized—the forms of expenditure
and the circumstances of the economy make a big difference—their work has since been
thoroughly discredited.  See, e.g.  Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2013) .  (In addition, they ig-
nore critical issues of causality.)
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budget multiplier that is much larger, plausibly twice the traditional number,
e.g., tax hikes at the very top reduce consumption by far less than the in-
creased expenditures expand it. Taking advantage of crowding in of con-
sumption and investment can further enhance the balanced-budget multiplier.
B. Contractionary Expansion7
There have been some discussions of instances in which government cut-
backs have been associated with economic expansion. Some have suggested
that these benefits arise from supply-side responses (e.g., as a result of the
lower tax rates, now or in the future, a kind of balanced-budget multiplier
emerges that is in the opposite direction of that just discussed). But in situa-
tions such as the current one, where aggregate demand is limiting output, sup-
ply-side responses can even increase unemployment and have an adverse ef-
fect on output: the downward pressure on wages shifts the distribution of in-
come towards profits, lowering aggregate demand. This suggests that the few
instances of government cutbacks bringing on expansion must be special and
peculiar. And indeed that is the case: they happened in small countries that
had the good fortune to have exports expand more than enough to fill the gap
in aggregate demand caused by reduced government expenditures. They are
also typically instances where (a) the country's trading partners were growing,
so the export market was expanding; and (b) the country had a flexible ex-
change rate, so it could quickly become more competitive by lowering interest
rates or undertaking other policies that affect the exchange rate. Beyond ex-
change-rate management, government policies (industrial policies and even
budget policies) can influence the extent to which exports expand.
For Europe and America now, the notion that exports could fill the gap
created by reduced government spending is a chimera, especially in view of
the current global slowdown.
C. Deleveraging
There are many in Europe and America who have pinned their hopes for a
quick recovery on deleveraging. There was excess private (mainly household)
debt prior to the crisis—especially so once the housing bubble had broken.
This indebtedness puts a damper on household spending. However, house-
holds are working down this debt. Once they do so, consumption will recover.
                                                     
7 For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Baker (2010), Jayadev and Konczal (2010),
and IMF (2010).
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High levels of indebtedness do have an adverse effect on consumption,
both because of the real wealth effect and because of the effect it has in im-
posing borrowing constraints (which my own work on imperfect capital mar-
kets, arising out of asymmetric information, has emphasized). Still, it would
be foolish to think that even after deleveraging, consumption will return to
anything like it was before the crisis.
The use of representative agent models has obscured what was going on in
the US before the crisis: the bottom 80% were consuming approximately
110% of their income. Even after they deleverage, even after the financial
sector is fully restored, we shouldn't expect them to consume, on average,
more than 100% of their income. With the top 20% garnering for themselves
some 40% of national income, and with their savings rate being roughly 15%,
one should expect a national savings rate of some 6%—somewhat higher than
we see today but somewhat lower than the prevailing rate in the US in earlier
decades. The continuing rise in inequality provides a further argument for
why we should not expect a return of the savings rate to pre-crisis levels.
The puzzle is why hasn't the US savings rate increased even more (from
slightly more than zero to around 4.5% today). The answer may have to do
with slow adjustments in consumption patterns, which are aspects perhaps not
adequately incorporated into the traditional models.
If, of course, we do get recovery of the economy through consumption, we
should be worried: it would mean a return to unsustainable patterns of the
kind that marked the pre-crisis days.
(Interestingly, the representative agent model without financial constraints
would suggest that leverage doesn’t matter at all. Debt simply reflects an
ownership claim on a stream of returns—a transfer of money from debtors to
creditors; but such transfers have no effects in this model.)8
D. The Liquidity Trap and the Zero Lower Bound
Before the crisis, many economists argued that monetary policy was the
main vehicle for regulating macro-economic activity, which the government
carried out by manipulating interest rates. I have never found convincing evi-
dence of this; indeed, the relationship between real interest rates and invest-
ment (especially outside of real estate) is hard to establish. In most models, if
                                                     
8 Of course, in an open economy model, if individuals in a country become indebted to those
abroad, it lowers their wealth, and thus their standard of living.  This just affects who gets
the benefits of the country’s output, not the level of output or its rate of growth.
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nominal and real interest rates are both put in the right-hand side of a regres-
sion, nominal interest rates appear to have more importance.
In this crisis, the Fed (along with other central banks) has lowered interest
rates to near zero—real interest rates have become negative-- without pro-
ducing much of a stimulative effect—indeed, far less than was desired or
hoped. I was not surprised, knowing that this situation was only a result of the
flawed modeling of investment in the standard model, where credit availabil-
ity, risk, and risk aversion are given short shrift. (I will return to this subject in
more detail below.)
Those who believe in the standard model have suggested that its funda-
mental problem is the "zero lower bound" on interest rates, a variant of the
Keynesian liquidity trap. But the situation during the Great Depression was
completely different from today’s. Then, prices were falling at 10% a year, so
the real interest rate, as interest rates approached zero, was 10%.9 Today, the
real interest rate is -2%. There is no reason to believe that if (expectations of)
the inflation rate were to rise to 4% or even 6%, and the real interest rate fell
to -4% or -6%, there would be a surge in investment. After all, there is excess
capacity in many sectors, and especially in real estate. Getting funds at a
lower rate is no reason to boost one's excess capacity. (To be sure, there is a
fast enough rate of inflation to make the real interest rate negative enough to
perhaps stimulate investment. But the uncertainty brought about by this
change in economic policy would itself have adverse effects on investment.10)
Again, the use of overly simplistic models has obscured some potentially
important adverse effects of lower interest rates, including lower long-term
interest rates achieved through Quantitative Easing. This would have the po-
tential to partially or totally offset the alleged benefits assumed to arise, par-
ticularly if the interest elasticity of investment is small. There are, for in-
stance, complex distributive effects. Traditionally, over the long run, creditors
have been considered better off than debtors; that being the case, the redis-
tributive effects seen in this scenario would be expected to enhance aggregate
demand. However, if debtors have long-term fixed-interest contracts, and if
                                                     
9 What should matter (in the standard theory), of course, for investment is the real product
interest rate, not the real consumption interest rate, and when there are large changes in
relative prices, as occurred during the Great Depression, these can differ markedly.
10 Some (Woodford, 2003, 2009) have suggested that what is required is a credible commit-
ment to inflation (e.g., through price-level targeting, which implies when there is less than
normal inflation now, perhaps due to deflationary pressures arising from excess capacity,
there will be higher than normal inflation in the future).  But even if the expected real inter-
est rate were the critical determinant of investment (which we suggest it is not), there is no
way that the monetary authority could commit itself to such a policy.
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there are groups like the elderly who are dependent on the income from gov-
ernment T-bills and bonds, the effects may well turn out to be negative. This
is especially so because the marginal propensity of the elderly to consume
may be higher than that of mortgagees. If Quantitative Easing leads to com-
modity booms (a question that remains in contention), then there is a distribu-
tive effect from households to commodity producers, which almost surely has
a downward impact on aggregate demand.
In a world of full rationality, as assumed in the traditional models, there is
a further negative effect: the long-term bonds that the Fed is buying now will
be sold back at a capital loss. The government is (in effect) buying long-term
bonds at a peak price. Therefore, under the Barro-Ricardo hypothesis, house-
holds should rationally include the expected capital loss in their budget con-
straints, and thus reduce consumption. (This is the case whether or not ac-
counting rules require the government to recognize the loss, or whether or not
the Fed goes through machinations to avoid selling them at a loss by holding
them to maturity.)
Finally, in the standard putty-clay model, firms, able to get access to (long-
term) capital at a very low interest rate, will invest in highly capital-intensive
technologies, because wages have not fallen as much as the cost of capital.
But this means, at any given level of demand for output, employment will
actually be reduced. Thus, loose monetary policy today may be setting up the
conditions for a jobless recovery in the future. Even today the outlines of such
a situation are already visible. The knowledge that weaker demand for labor
lies ahead affects consumption demand directly and indirectly, as it puts fur-
ther downward pressure on wages, worsening the distribution of income.
(The import of this is not that we should have tight monetary policy. It is
that we cannot rely on monetary policy for our recovery, and that other gov-
ernment policies have to be put in place to offset the potential and real adverse
effects that we have described.)
E. The New Normal11
Finally, some have argued that there is a new normal: we should just re-
sign ourselves to the acceptability of a 7% or 8% rate of unemployment. It is
structural, they say, a result of the mismatch of workers to jobs. There is much
to indicate that, while structural problems may exist, there is also a deficiency
in aggregate demand. If serious bottlenecks were afflicting the labor market,
we would expect to see, for instance, wages for those laborers rising and—
given the downward rigidity of wages—fairly rapid run-ups in average wage
                                                     
11 See also Konczal (2011).
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en the downward rigidity of wages—fairly rapid run-ups in average wage
rates.
My own research with Bruce Greenwald and other colleagues12 has em-
phasized the need for structural transformation as the solution to the underly-
ing problem; but even then, we show that government expenditures can re-
duce unemployment and lift welfare; in addition, we argue that government
policies aimed at facilitating structural transformation can be particularly ef-
fective. The existence of a structural problem does not mean that we should sit
idly by and accept high levels of underutilization of resources indefinitely.
3. Key Failings
Modern macro-economics grew out of an attempt to reconcile traditional
Keynesian macro-economics with micro-economics (Greenwald and Stiglitz,
1987a). There were two ways to achieve that reconciliation—try to adapt
macro-economics to the micro-economic model of the time, or try to glean
from macro-economics insights about what was wrong with the traditional
micro-economic models and reform them accordingly. Much of the main-
stream of economics took the former course. This was an ironic state of affairs
because it was occurring just at the time that standard micro-economics was
itself under attack, from the proponents of theories of imperfect and asymmet-
ric information, game theory, and behavioral economics.
The standard representative agent model, and the work that grew out of it,
had several flaws. It ignored information imperfections, couldn't embrace
information asymmetries, and disregarded the insights from game theory and
behavioral economics. My own research into equilibrium models with asym-
metric information but rational expectations clearly demonstrates that there
are many important phenomena that simply cannot be explained even within
that model, even if it is able to explain many phenomena that the standard
model with perfect information fails to account for.13
Once one went beyond the standard model, one could easily explain mar-
ket failures, including markets that did not clear. Indeed, the presumption that
markets were efficient (Adam Smith's invisible hand) was reversed by the
Greeenwald-Stiglitz theorem (1986), which showed that whenever there was
asymmetric information or imperfect risk markets—that is, essentially al-
ways—markets are not constrained Pareto efficient (taking into account the
costs of obtaining information and creating risk markets). That has some im-
                                                     
12 See, for instance, Delli Gatti et al., (2012a and 2012b).
13 See Stiglitz (1982).
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portant implications: privately profitable transactions may not be socially
desirable. The banks may have incentives to engage in contracts with each
other that make, for instance, the economic system more unstable (which they
did).
Ongoing work in financial economics and macro-economics is providing a
fuller taxonomy of the systemic biases in market allocations, e.g., Jeanne and
Korinek's work (2010, 2012) showing that there may be excessive borrowing,
especially in foreign currencies, or Yildiz's work (2011) pointing to excessive
leverage on the part of banks. The intuition behind these results is simple:
interventions (e.g., taxes) have a second-order direct effect on welfare, but a
first-order effect in shifting constraints, such as self-selection constraints,
incentive-compatibility constraints, or borrowing constraints, and in the wel-
fare effects of the induced changes in prices and price distributions. As
Greenwald and Stiglitz point out, in such situations, pecuniary externalities
matter.14
Today's standard model began from a framework that didn't, and couldn't,
embrace the kinds of market imperfections and market failures that could
explain macro-economic behavior. There was no role for agency costs or ex-
ternalities, no analysis of incentives for transparency or non-transparency, and
no explanation of why financial institutions would have had incentive struc-
tures that led to excessive risk taking and short sighted behavior.
While it is important to derive macro-behavior from micro-foundations, it
is crucial that we derive it from the right micro-foundations, consistent with
actual behavior.15 And, indeed, it is hard to reconcile macro-behavior under
the old-fashioned standard micro-models with reasonable specifications, e.g.,
labor supply, risk aversion.
Over the years, as the deficiencies of the standard model have become ap-
parent, a Ptolemaic attempt has been mounted to repair it through such
amendments as adding on additional constraints, allowing for some individual
heterogeneity, etc. But as I explained in my Smith lecture, these attempted
patches remain unsatisfactory. They obviously failed in both of the recent
crises, proving themselves to be largely irrelevant. Part of the problem is their
                                                     
14 Earlier, Stiglitz (1982) showed the welfare effects of changes in price distributions as a
result of changes in investment allocations.  Again, markets were not in general (con-
strained) Pareto efficient.
15 Ironically, even much of their criticism of Keynesian behavior as being "untheoretical" is
itself ungrounded; it didn't take into account the Mantel-Sonnenschein results showing that
micro-theory puts few restrictions on aggregate demand functions.  Of course, if one makes
unreasonable assumptions, such as that all individuals are identical, then there are strong re-
strictions.
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tendency to focus too much on things of second-order import and too little on
things of first-order importance. As I said before, all models are simplifica-
tions, and some may be useful in providing insights into one problem, others
into another problem. The task before us is to formulate models that employ
the simplifications that are most relevant for understanding short-run macro-
economic behavior.
Among the central flaws of the standard model are its excessive reliance
on rational expectations, in ignoring distribution, and its failure to model the
credit system (banking, securitization), including paying insufficient attention
to crucial institutional details (e.g., the design of the mortgage system). If
everyone were identical, these issues would be irrelevant. Finance is uninter-
esting if the person can only borrow from himself. As I noted before, there
can't be information asymmetries (apart from acute schizophrenia).
Rational expectations are particularly unhelpful in understanding periods
of structural transformation, as when the economy goes from agriculture to
manufacturing or from manufacturing to the service-sector economy—simply
because such transformations happen rarely, and those particular transforma-
tions have never happened before. We have argued that the Great Depression
is intimately associated with the former transition, the Great Recession with
the latter.
The disparity between the standard model and reality inevitably leads to
intellectual incoherence on the part of policymakers attempting to be guided
by it. For example, in the standard model, diversification leads to lower risk,
so policymakers argued for the removal of capital controls, unleashing the
free flow of capital across international borders, thereby enhancing diversifi-
cation. And some policy makers actually fervently believed in the model: as
the crisis erupted, they believed that diversification would enable the US to
easily weather the coming storm.
But in the wake of that crisis, attention has shifted to contagion. Contagion
suggests a disease. Countries that are more interdependent are more likely to
suffer from contagion. Suddenly, interdependence no longer seems like such a
virtue. Indeed, in epidemiology (from which the term contagion comes), the
appropriate response is quarantining the afflicted patients.
A coherent model would incorporate the advantages of diversification
prior to the crisis and the disadvantages after a crisis (and crises have been a
regular feature of the global economy since the period of liberalization began,
in 1980). But none of the standard models did this.
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The underlying mathematical structures of the standard model also have to
be changed: when there are non-convexities, risk diversification can amplify
rather than reduce risk, and non-convexities are pervasive in the economy (see
Stiglitz, 2010a, 2010b). Even before the crisis, there had been work showing
how the architecture of the economic system could worsen financial fragility,
leading to bankruptcy cascades and systemic risk (Allen and Gale, 2000;
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003; Delli Gatti et al., 2006; Battiston et al., 2007,
2012a, 2012b; Gallegati et al., 2008). Since then, there have been many more
studies.16
One of the most significant failures of the standard model was its inability
to provide an adequate analysis of the supply of credit (Greenwald and Sti-
glitz, 2003). Credit is not the same as money (though in normal times, credit
supply and money supply are related). In standard theory, there is no credit
rationing, nor is there a liquidity “problem,” though, of course, in times of
crisis, the focus is on liquidity. The standard theory cannot explain the lack of
availability of credit—even to banks that are allegedly "solvent" but illiquid.
Ironically, most macro- models, even those used by Central Banks, do not
have a “banking sector”—yet it was problems in banks that were at the heart
of the crisis. Not surprisingly, given the absence of a banking sector, most
macro- models do not have a “shadow banking sector” either—and therefore
they have nothing to say about the shift from the banking to the shadow
banking sector, which has proven so problematic for our economy.
So too the standard models focused on the real T-bill rate, the rate at which
government can borrow. But what matters in borrowing is the interest rate at
which companies can borrow, not the interest rate at which the government
can borrow, and the spread between the two is highly variable, an endogenous
variable that has to be explained.
Nor did the analyses of banking regulation before, or after, the crisis in-
corporate basic insights of modern financial economics—like the Modigliani-
Miller theorem, suggesting that additional leverage does not improve the effi-
ciency of the banking system, or the Grossman-Stiglitz theorem, holding that
fundamental informational problems would arise in any attempt to move to-
wards securitization of products like mortgages.
The fundamental point is that one cannot summarize the financial sector in
a money-demand equation. (And even worse, the money-demand equation
doesn't reflect the realities of the modern financial sector, where cash-
management accounts mean that there is essentially no opportunity cost to
                                                     
16 Haldane (2009), Haldane and May (2010), De Masi et al. (2011).
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holding money, where most transactions are mediated through credit, not
money, and where most transactions are exchanges of assets, not income-
generating transactions).
While the standard model focuses too little attention on the determinants of
the supply of credit, it focuses too much attention on the problem of intertem-
poral maximization—not surprising, given the historical evolution of the
model. But such intertemporal maximization problems provide little insight
into the short-term variations in the level of consumption (savings rates),
which are at the heart of short-term macro-economic analyses. And interest-
ingly, none of the policy discussions even refer to such models.17
4. An Example: Bank Recapitalization
Earlier I remarked on the absence of detailed modeling of the financial
sector, including financial constraints and the determinants of the supply of
credit. Summarizing the financial sector in a money-demand equation may
work (in some sense) in normal times, but not now, or in other times of crisis
(such as East Asia in the ‘90s).
Banks continue to play an important (though diminished) role in the supply
of credit. They are the repository of institutional knowledge (information) that
is not easily transferred; their internalization of information externalities re-
sults in better incentives for the acquisition of information. They are still the
locus of most SME lending (and variability in SME investment and employ-
ment is central to understanding macro-economic variability).
Without good models of banking, monetary authorities had little to say
about the best way of restructuring banks. The inability to restart lending to
SME’s in the aftermath of the crisis should not be a surprise; but it is not, as
some have suggested, just the standard liquidity trap, where Keynes focused
on the difficulty of getting interest rates to zero: how could it be, with interest
rates near zero and real interest rates negative? Rather, it arises from the fact
that even zero T-bill rates may not induce banks to lend (Greenwald and Sti-
glitz, 2003).
                                                     
17 Part of the reason is that with durable goods, the flow of consumption services is detached
from the flow of expenditures, which can be affected by borrowing constraints, expecta-
tions, and perceptions of risk, including the risk of unemployment.  While these variables
can be incorporated into a more fully specified intertemporal maximization model, doing so
is complex, and doing so in a way that is adequate for short-term macro-economic analysis
requires models with enough heterogeneity to incorporate some who are capital constrained
and some who are not.
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Much of the discussion paid little attention to the consequences of how
banks would be recapitalized (except among some members of both the Bush
and Obama Administrations, who suggested that private money was better
than public money—in spite of the unimpressive record of the private sector
prior to the crisis, wasting money on a scale beyond the ambitions of most
governments). The implicit assumption was that bank managers would treat
government-provided funds just like any other source of funds. But an alter-
native, and perhaps more plausible assumption, is that in the absence of a
change in control, bank managers would maximize the expected utility of
profits to the old owners (caring little about the returns to the government).
Consider the problem facing many governments: whether to provide funds
through preferred shares or equity. We can analyze the consequences by hy-
pothesizing that the bank maximizes the utility (U) of the profits accruing to
private owners, π,
Max EU (π)
where π = max {(1 – α)(Y – rB – rgBg), 0}
where α represents the dilution to government (through shares and/or war-
rants), rg is the coupon on the preferred shares, Bg is the capital injection
though preferred shares, and r is the cost of (government insured) deposits to
the bank. (U” < 0 reflecting risk aversion.)
We can distinguish three states of nature (assuming we can order the states
by the level of macro-economic activity, denoted by θ)
(a) θ≤θ1 :  bank goes bankrupt
(b) θ1 ≤ θ ≤  θ2 :  old owners make no profit, but bank does not go bankrupt
(c)  θ ≥   θ2 :  bank makes profit for old owners, preferred shares are fully paid
Different financial arrangements affect the size of each region and the
weight put on each. If the government charges an actuarially fair interest rate
on preferred shares, then rg > r, so the region in which old owners make no
profit is actually increased. On the other hand, the larger the fraction of gov-
ernment compensation that takes the form of shares, the smaller the region (a)
and (b), and the less distorted is the decision making.
It is easy to show in this simple model that the optimal way to provide fi-
nance to banks is full share ownership, while the worst (with respect to deci-
sion making) is injecting capital just through preferred shares (the route actu-
ally chosen).
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A full modeling of the banking sector is obviously more complex. But
what should be clear is that the simplistic macro- models had little if anything
to say about these critical issues—and much of the conventional wisdom was
simply misleading.
5. Asking the Right Questions18
Despite the flawed assumptions underlying the standard model, confidence
in it persisted partly because attention was directed at the wrong question. The
real objective of macro-economic models is not to improve our forecast a little
bit when things are going well, but to predict the “big” events, critical turning
points, like the beginning of a recession. The loss in welfare in failing to pre-
dict and deal well with the financial crisis—a loss in output in Europe and the
United States that now amounts to trillions of dollars—is an order of magni-
tude greater than any gain that might have arisen from an increased ability to
fine-tune the economy when things are going normally.
The three questions it should have focused on are, in the context of deep
downturns:
1. What causes economic fluctuations?
2. How do we explain rapid declines?
3. How do we explain slow recoveries?
The standard model’s failings with respect to the first are particularly tell-
ing: it assumed that the sources of the disturbances were exogenous "technol-
ogy shocks," not endogenous—not the credit and other bubbles. What is re-
markable is that such endogenous disturbances have been at the root of major
fluctuations since the beginning of capitalism. Yet the standard models ig-
nored history (Kindleberger, 1978), as well as theoretical advances (Minsky,
1982) that could have offered possible explanations of these endogenous
fluctuations.
In the standard neo-classical model, the economy has buffers that help ab-
sorb shocks, rather than amplify them. Moreover, in the absence of war, state
variables (that seemingly should be determining economic behavior) change
slowly. Why, then, can the state of the economy change so quickly? Models
with financial market imperfections (Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1987b, 1988a,
1988b, 1988c, 1990, 1993a) give rise to financial accelerators and provide
part of the answer; the fact that DSGE models have incorporated such con-
straints in recent years is a move in the right direction. But I don't believe that
                                                     
18 This section draws upon Stiglitz (2011).
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even these fully account for the seeming "fragility" of the economy. A
broader range of models needs to be considered (Stiglitz, 2011, 2012).
In many ways, the most important puzzle is how to explain slow recover-
ies. After all, the country’s physical, human, and natural resources today are
essentially the same as they were before the crisis, yet output in some coun-
tries is still lower than it was before the crisis. In a representative agent model,
even debt would not be a problem, since it would be money we owed to our-
selves: it doesn't change net worth. And if debt does matter, it implies that
distribution also matters and in fact that distribution is of first-order impor-
tance. But our standard macro- models, which typically pay scant attention to
distribution, now cannot enlighten us as to why it should matter so much. But
even if debt matters, in the standard neo-classical model, there is still a full
employment equilibrium. One might have thought that policy analyses would
focus on what that equilibrium looks like and how we might attain it. By con-
trast, some of the policy prescriptions seem to have us move away from that
equilibrium: lowering wages could lower aggregate demand, leading to still
more unemployment.
With Bruce Greenwald and several of my other colleagues, we have con-
structed models in which economic downturns, such as the current one, persist
because, in the process of structural transformation, those in the dying sector
get "trapped" by mobility costs. Government spending, and especially indus-
trial policies, can lead to higher output and lower unemployment, thus facili-
tating the transition.
6. The Fundamental Flaws in the Eurozone Framework
The Euro was a political project, conceived to help bring the countries of
Europe together. It was widely recognized at the time that Europe was not an
optimal currency area.19 Labor mobility was limited, the countries’ economies
were vulnerable to different kinds of shocks, and there were divergent long-
term productivity trends. While it was a political project, the politics was not
strong enough to create the economic institutions that might have given the
Euro a fair chance of success. The hope was that over time, that would hap-
pen. But, of course, when national economies were doing well, few felt the
impetus to “complete” the project, and when a crisis finally occurred (with the
global recession that began in the United States in 2008), it was hard to think
through carefully what should be done to ensure the success of the Euro.
                                                     
19 See Mundell (1961).
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I and others who supported the concept of European integration hoped that
when Greece found itself in crisis, in January 2010, European leaders would
display both an understanding of what needs to be done to ensure the stability
of Greece and the survival of the Euro and enough commitment to European
solidarity to ensure that the requisite steps were undertaken. That did not hap-
pen, and, swiftly, a project originally designed to bring Europe together be-
came a source of divisiveness. Germans talked about Europe not being a
transfer union—a euphemistic and seemingly principled way of saying that
they were uninterested in helping their partners, as they reminded everyone of
how they had paid so much for the reunification of Germany. Not surpris-
ingly, others talked about the high price they had paid in World War II and the
enormous German debts that had been forgiven at the end of the War. Selec-
tive memories played out, as Germans talked about the dangers of high infla-
tion; but was it inflation or high unemployment that had brought on the Na-
tional Socialist government? Is it inflation or unemployment that will fuel the
political unrest that lay ahead?
Greece was castigated for its high debts and deficits; it was natural to
blame the crisis on excessive profligacy, but again there was selective mem-
ory: Spain and Ireland had low debt-to-GDP ratios and a fiscal surplus in the
years before the crisis. Therefore, no one could blame these countries’ pre-
dicament on fiscal profligacy. At the same time, it was clear that Germany’s
prescription—more severe and more effectively enforced budgetary cut-
backs—was not going to help Greece climb out of its hole. On the contrary,
there was every reason to believe that this very prescription—known as aus-
terity—would deepen the crisis. Indeed, by so manifestly showing their pro-
found ignorance of the fundamentals underlying the crisis, the authorities
scared the markets. Even if they had understood what was at stake, even if
they repeatedly reiterated their commitment to the European project, their
display of enormous resistance to undertaking the necessary reforms in the
European framework surely contributed to the markets’ loss of confidence,
helping to explain why each of the so-called rescue measures turned out to be
only temporary palliatives.
In the remainder of this section, I describe several of the underlying struc-
tural properties of the Eurozone that, if not make the continuation of this cri-
sis or the occurrence of future crises inevitable, certainly make them likely.
(What is required is not so much the structural adjustment of the individual
countries, but the structural adjustment of the Euro framework.) Many of
these are associated with rules that reflected the neo-classical model, with the
associated neo-liberal policy prescriptions fashionable (in some circles) at the
time of the creation of the Euro.
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Europe made two fundamental mistakes: First, it enshrined in its “consti-
tution” these fads and fashions, the concerns of the time, without providing
for enough flexibility when responding to changing circumstances and under-
standings.. And secondly, it failed to notice that even at that time, the limita-
tions of the neo-classical model had been widely exposed—the problems
posed, for instance, by imperfect competition, information, and markets to
which I referred earlier. Likewise, the neo-classical model failed to recognize
the many market failures that require government intervention, or in which
government intervention would improve the performance of the overall econ-
omy. Most importantly from a macro-economic perspective, there was the
widespread belief that so long as the government maintained a stable macro-
economy—typically interpreted as maintaining price stability—overall eco-
nomic performance would be assured. By the same token, if the government
kept budgets in line (kept deficits and debts within the limit set by the Maas-
tricht Convention), the member countries’ economies would “converge” so
that the single currency system would work. The founders of the Eurozone
apparently thought these budgetary/macro-conditions were enough for the
countries to converge, i.e., to have sufficient “similarity” for a common cur-
rency to work. They were wrong. Equally misguided was the focus of the
founders of the Eurozone on government failure, not market failure, and thus
they circumscribed the actions that governments could take, setting the stage
for the market failures that would bring on the Euro crisis.
So too, much of the framework built into the Eurozone might have en-
hanced efficiency, if Europe had gotten the details right and if the neo-
classical model were correct. But the devil is in the details, and some of the
prescribed provisions led to inefficiency and instability. The following para-
graphs illustrate what I have in mind.
Free mobility of factors without a common debt leads to inefficient and un-
stable allocation of factors. The principle of free mobility is to ensure that
factors move to where (marginal) returns are highest, and if factor prices are
equal to marginal productivity, that should happen. But what individuals care
about, among other things, is the after-tax returns to labor, and this depends
not only on the marginal productivity of labor (in the neo-classical model) but
also on taxes and the provision of public goods. Taxes, in turn, depend in part
on the burden imposed by inherited debt. This can be seen in the cases of
Ireland, Greece, and Spain. All three were facing towering levels of inherited
debt (a debt that had not swollen to its current levels by making investments
in education, technology, or infrastructure, i.e., through the acquisition of
assets, but through financial and macro-economic mismanagement in the case
of Greece and Ireland or as a result of a crisis that was not of their own mak-
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ing, in the case of Spain). This implies migration away from these highly in-
debted countries to those with less indebtedness, even when marginal produc-
tivities are the same; and the more individuals move out, the greater the
“equilibrium” tax burden on the remainder becomes, accelerating the move-
ment of labor away from an efficient allocation.20 (Of course, in the short run,
migration may bring positive benefits to the crisis country, as it reduces the
burden of unemployment insurance and enhances domestic purchasing power
as the remittances from abroad sent by the emigrants roll in. Whether these
“benefits” to migration outweigh the adverse effects in the short run noted
above is an empirical question. The outward migration also hides the severity
of the underlying downturn, since it means that the unemployment rate is less,
possibly far less, than it otherwise would be.)21
Free mobility of capital and goods without tax harmonization can lead to
an inefficient allocation of capital and/or reduce the potential for redistribu-
tive taxation, leading to high levels of after-tax and transfer inequality. Com-
petition among jurisdictions can be healthy, but there can also be a race to the
bottom. Capital goes to the jurisdiction that taxes it at the lowest rate, not
where its marginal productivity is the highest. To compete, other jurisdictions
must lower the taxes they impose on capital, and since capital is more une-
qually distributed than labor, this reduces the scope for redistributive taxation.
(A similar argument applies to the allocation of skilled labor.) Inequality, it is
increasingly recognized, is not just a moral issue: it affects the performance of
the economy in numerous ways (Stiglitz, 2012).
Free migration might result in politically unacceptable patterns of location
of economic activity. The general theory of migration/local public goods has
shown that decentralized patterns of migration may well result in inefficient
and socially desirable patterns of location of economic activity and concen-
trations of population. There can be congestion and agglomeration external-
ities (both positive and negative) that arise from free migration.  That is why
many countries have an explicit policy for regional development, attempting
to offset the inefficient and/or socially unacceptable patterns emerging from
unfettered markets.
In the context of Europe, free migration (especially that arising from debt
obligations inherited from the past) may result in depopulation not only of
certain regions within countries but of certain countries. One of the important
                                                     
20 Interestingly, this problem has long been recognized in the theory of fiscal federalism/local
public goods.  See, e.g., Stiglitz (1977, 1983a, 1983b).
21 By the same token, if some of the burden of taxation is imposed on capital, it will induce
capital to move out of the country.
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adjustment mechanisms in the United States (which shares a common cur-
rency) is internal migration; and, if such migration leads to the depopulation
of an entire state, there is limited concern.22 But Greece or Ireland are, and
should be, concerned about the depopulation of their homelands.
The single-market principle for financial institutions and capital, too, can
lead to a regulatory race to the bottom, with at least some of the costs of the
failures borne by other jurisdictions. The failure of a financial institution im-
poses costs on others (evidenced so clearly in the crisis of 2008), and govern-
ments will not typically take into account these cross-border costs. That is
why either there has to be regulation by the host country (Stiglitz and mem-
bers of a UN Commission of Experts, 2010), or there has to be strong regula-
tion at the European level.
Worse still, confidence in any country’s banking system rests partially on
the confidence in the ability and willingness of the bank’s government to bail
it out—and/or in the existence of (1) institutional frameworks that reduce the
likelihood that a bailout will be necessary, (2) special funds set aside should a
bailout be necessary, and (3) procedures in place to ensure that depositors
will be made whole.  Typically, there is an implicit subsidy, from which banks
in jurisdictions with governments with greater bailout capacity benefit. Thus,
money flowed into the United States after the 2008 global crisis, which fail-
ures within the United States’ financial system had brought about, simply
because there was more confidence that the United States had the willingness
and ability to bail out its banks. Similarly, today in Europe: what Spaniard or
Greek would rationally keep his money in a local bank, when there is (almost)
equal convenience and greater safety in putting it in a German bank?23 Only
by paying much higher interest rates can banks in those countries compete,
but that puts them at a competitive disadvantage; and the increase in interest
rate required may be too great—the bank would quickly appear to be non-
viable. What happens typically is capital flight (or, in the current case, what
has been described as a capital jog: the surprise is not that capital is leaving,
but that it is not leaving faster). But that sets in motion a downward spiral: as
capital leaves, the country’s banks restrict lending, the economy weakens, the
                                                     
22 Some see an advantage: buying influence over that country’s senators because it is less
expensive.
23 The exit from Spanish banks, while significant--and leading to a credit crunch--has been
slower than some had anticipated.  This, in turn, is a consequence of institutional and market
imperfections (e.g., rules about knowing your customer, designed to curb money launder-
ing), which, interestingly, the neo-classical model underlying much of Europe's policy
agenda ignored.  There is far less of a single market than is widely thought to exist.
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perceived ability of the country to bail out its banks weakens, and capital is
further incentivized to leave.
There are two more fallacies that are related to the current (and inevitable,
in the absence of policy and structural reforms) failures of the Eurozone. The
first is the belief that there are natural forces for convergence in productivity,
without government intervention. To be sure, there can be rising returns (re-
flected in clustering), the consequence of which is that countries with techno-
logical advantages maintain those advantages, unless there are countervailing
forces brought about by government (industrial) policies. But European com-
petition laws prevented, or at least inhibited, such policies.24
The second fallacy is the belief that it is necessary and almost sufficient by
itself, for good macro-economic performance to have low and stable inflation
maintained by the monetary authorities. This led to the mandate of the Euro-
pean Central Bank to focus on inflation, in contrast to that of the Federal Re-
serve, whose mandate includes growth, employment, and (now) financial
stability. The contrasting mandates can lead to an especially counterproduc-
tive response to a crisis especially one accompanied by cost-push inflation
arising from, say, high energy or food prices. While the Fed lowered interest
rates in response to the crisis, the continuing inflationary concerns in Europe
meant that the Fed’s actions were not matched by reductions there. The up-
shot was an appreciating Euro, with downward effects on European output.
Had the ECB taken actions to lower the Euro’s exchange value, it would have
stimulated the economy, partially offsetting the effects of austerity. As it was,
it allowed the US to engage in competitive devaluation against it.
These beliefs also meant that the ECB (and Central Banks within each of
the member countries) studiously avoided doing anything about the real-estate
bubbles that were mounting in several of them. This was in spite of the fact
that the East Asia crisis had shown that private-sector misconduct—not that of
government—could bring on an economic crisis. Europe similarly paid no
attention to the run-up in current-account balances in several of the countries.
Ex post, many policymakers admit that it was a mistake to ignore these
current-account imbalances or financial market excesses. But the then under-
lying ideology provided no framework (it still doesn’t) for identifying good
“imbalances,” when capital is flowing into the country because markets have
rationally identified good investment opportunities, and distinguishing them
from bad ones, i.e., those that are attributable to market excesses.
                                                     
24 Even the World Bank has changed its views on industrial policies; yet views about industrial
policies are to a large extent enshrined in the Eurozone’s basic economic framework.  See
Lin (2012), Lin and Stiglitz (2013), and Lin, Patel, and Stiglitz (2013).
Joseph E. Stiglitz 23
The immediate problem
The most immediate problem facing the Eurozone is that creating a single
currency took away two of the critical adjustment mechanisms (interest rates
and exchange rates) and didn’t put anything in their place. The United States
has an economic framework that deals with most of the problems described
earlier: two-thirds of all government expenditures occur at the national level,
and the states are restricted (by their own constitutions) from incurring debt,
other than for capital projects.25 Most banks rely on Federal deposit insurance.
States are not restricted from engaging in “industrial policies,” and poorer
states have actively recruited firms to locate in their jurisdictions.26
Some hoped that internal devaluation would serve as an effective substi-
tute, i.e., domestic wages and prices would fall. But there are three funda-
mental problems with this solution: (a) it is hard to coordinate such decreases,
and in the absence of such coordination, there can be large and costly changes
in relative prices; (b) because debt is denominated in Euros, and thus is not
contingent on domestic wages and prices, debt burdens increase—with ad-
verse consequences seen in bankruptcies and disruptions of the domestic fi-
nancial system; (c) the decrease in collateral values and incomes (especially
relative to debts) would have tightened financial constraints, with first-order
adverse effects on the economy. Most importantly, if internal devaluation
were an effective substitute for nominal devaluations, then the gold standard
would not have been an impediment to adjusting to the disturbances sur-
rounding the Great Depression; it would not have been the case that those
countries that abandoned the gold standard earlier would have done better. In
the case of Argentina prior to its 2001 crisis, prices did fall, but not enough—
again, an internal devaluation is not a substitute for exchange-rate adjustment.
Europe has responded to the crisis by refusing to recognize that there were
any structural problems with the EU arrangements. Like the IMF and the US
Treasury in so many other crises (including the 2008 crisis), it initially saw
the problem as a liquidity crisis, a temporary loss of confidence; if the IMF,
ECB, and the Commission showed that they stood behind each of the coun-
tries, confidence would be restored and the crisis resolved. All that was re-
quired was a temporary injection of funds (a loan to the bank or the country).
But, of course, such loans don’t improve the balance sheet of the country (or
                                                     
25 These constitutional requirements have, in recent years, been subverted by the creation of
unfunded pension liabilities, which may create within the States some of the same adverse
dynamics described earlier for Europe.
26 However, this has created, to some extent, a race to the bottom, the adverse dynamic that we
described as characterizing Europe.
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the bank), and if the problems are more fundamental, then they can have
negative effects on other claimants, especially if the bailouts are senior to
other creditors and even more so if a high interest rate is charged. That’s why
the East Asian bailouts and the Argentine bailouts had little discernible effect.
It is not surprising that neither did the European sovereign bailouts; it is only
surprising that it took Europe’s leaders so long to recognize this. Later, the
ECB lent money to the banks, to lend onward to the governments, to help
support bond prices (lower sovereign yields), in the long-term refinancing
operation (LTRO) program. Because the money provided to the banks was
lent at close to a zero interest rate, and the banks could lend the money on-
ward at much higher rates, this program was, in effect, a massive gift to Euro-
pean banks. The fact that European officials looked at the take-up of the pro-
gram as a measure of “success” (as well as the temporary reduction in sover-
eign risk premiums) was perhaps symptomatic of a lack of understanding of
the underlying problems. To be sure, there were real effects from the hidden
recapitalization of the banks. But the effects on sovereign risk premiums were
temporary: only coercion would induce them to permanently put a dispropor-
tionately large fraction of their balance sheet in these highly risky assets.
Indeed, there was something especially peculiar about Europe’s attempt at
a bootstrap operation, whereby lending to the government would help bail out
the banks, and lending to the banks would help bail out the governments.
But at least this bootstrap attempt didn’t have the adverse effects of aus-
terity: predictably, austerity brought growth down, and as austerity spread
throughout Europe, it helped bring on a European-wide recession, weakening
the banks at the same time that it had disappointing fiscal benefits. As growth
slowed and the ranks of the unemployed increased, revenues declined (from
what they otherwise would have been) and expenditures (e.g., for unemploy-
ment benefits) climbed.
European officials who prescribed austerity suggested, when these pro-
grams were first adopted,27 that by now those who adopted their programs
would be on their way to restored prosperity.28 They have been wrong, and
repeatedly so. They have repeatedly underestimated the magnitude of the
downturn that their policies would bring about, and as a result, they have con-
                                                     
27 For example, British Conservative David Cameron in his April 2009 speech, “The Age of
Austerity,” expounded on austerity not as just a short-term strategy but as a philosophical
shift that would restore the vibrancy of Britain’s economy. Without it, he said, “[W]e risk
becoming once again the sick man of Europe. Our recovery will be held back, and our chil-
dren will be weighed down, by a millstone of debt.” The actual results of austerity in Britain
have not lived up to his promises, to say the least.
28 This section is a revised version of the preface to Stiglitz (2012).
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sistently underestimated the fiscal benefit that would be derived: deeper
downturns inevitably result in lower revenues and higher expenditures for
unemployment and social programs. Though they then try to shift the blame
back on to the crisis countries for missing the fiscal targets, the fact is that it is
their misdiagnosis of the problem and the resulting wrong prescription that
should be held accountable. Spain and Greece are in Depression—there is no
other way to describe the situation—and that depression is largely a result of
misguided policies foisted on these countries (though their own leaders are to
blame, for having acquiesced, but only as seeing, perhaps wrongly, that the
proposed “solution” was better than the alternative).
Today, the problem in Europe is inadequate overall demand. As the
downturn continues, banks are less willing to lend, housing prices decline, and
households become poorer and poorer and more uncertain of the future, de-
pressing consumption further. Europe’s problem today is lack of aggregate
demand, and austerity exacerbates that problem.
No large economy—and Europe is a large economy--has ever emerged
from a crisis at the same time that it has imposed austerity. Austerity always,
inevitably, and predictably makes matters worse. The only examples where
fiscal stringency has been associated with recovery are in countries where
reductions in government spending are offset by increases in exports. These
are generally small countries, typically with flexible exchange rates, and
where trading partners are growing robustly. But that is hardly the situation
confronting Europe’s crisis countries today: their major trading partners are in
recession, and each has no control over its exchange rate.29
European leaders have recognized that Europe’s problems will not be
solved without growth. But they have failed to explain how growth can be
achieved with austerity. Instead, they assert that what is needed is a restora-
tion of confidence. However, austerity will not bring about either growth or
confidence. Europe’s sorry record of ultimately failed policies—after repeated
attempts to fashion patchwork solutions for economic problems it was misdi-
agnosing—have undermined confidence. Because austerity has destroyed
growth, it has also destroyed confidence, and will continue to do so, no matter
how many speeches are given about the importance of confidence and growth.
The austerity measures have been particularly ineffective, because the
market understood that they would bring with them recessions, political tur-
moil, and disappointing improvements in the fiscal position, as tax revenues
                                                     
29 Alesina and Ardagna (2010) have tried to propagate the idea that expansionary contractions
are possible.  But there is a growing consensus that their analyses are badly flawed, and that
that is not the case.  See, e.g., IMF (2010), Baker (2010), and Jayadev and Konczal (2010).
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declined. Rating agencies have downgraded countries instituting austerity
measures, and rightly so. Spain was downgraded as the first austerity meas-
ures were passed: one of the rating agencies believed that Spain would do
what it promised, and it knew that that meant low growth and a worsening of
its economic woes.
By the same token, while structural reforms will be important for future
growth and standards of living in many of the European countries, including
those currently afflicted with crisis, structural reforms take time. They affect
long-term standards of living, but structural rigidities did not precipitate the
crisis. It was a financial and real-estate crisis that did that.30 Most of the
structural reforms are supply-side measures, but as I noted, the problem today
is an inadequacy of demand; worse, many of the structural reforms will exac-
erbate that problem, especially those that end with lower wages and have ad-
verse distributional effects.
Responding to the crisis
This analysis of the fundamental flaws underlying the Eurozone suggests a
set of policies that might help resolve the crisis. I say might: these reforms are
necessary to make the Euro work, but they are not necessarily sufficient. The
divergence between an optimal currency area and the Eurozone—the diver-
gences, for instance, in economic structures that can give rise to desired
changes in exchange rates, either in the short run in response to shocks, or in
the long run in response to systemic differences in productivity and inflation
trends—may be too large to make a system of a single currency work.
Mutualization of debt
The first necessary reform is a common fiscal framework—more than and
fundamentally different from an austerity pact, or a strengthened version of
the growth and stability pact. As I noted, it was not overspending that brought
on Spain’s or Ireland’s problems.
One of the basic problems confronting the Eurozone is that current ar-
rangements have effectively meant that countries were borrowing in a cur-
rency over which they had no control—much like developing and emerging
markets that borrowed in dollars or Euros. There is no risk that the US will
ever default on its debt, owed in dollars, simply because it controls the print-
ing presses (a fact that at least one of the rating agencies seems unaware of).
                                                     
30 As is the case in the United States, there may be deeper problems: structural transformation
that is required by the decline in manufacturing employment and globalization.
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The value of those dollars might diminish were it to resort to such measures,
but (politics aside) there is unlikely to be any event of sufficient moment to
change expectations of inflation so dramatically as to bring on a crisis.
What is required then is “mutualization” of debt—European-wide debt,
owed in Euros. This would make Europe’s debt similar to America’s debt, and
with Europe’s overall debt-to-GDP ratio lower than that of the US, presuma-
bly interest rates would be comparable. Such mutualization would lower in-
terest rates, allowing more spending to stimulate the economy and restore
growth.
Mutualizaton of debt could be accomplished through a number of institu-
tional mechanisms (Eurobonds, ECB borrowing and on-lending to nations).
How to design such a system (in a way that did not lead to excessive borrow-
ing) would take me beyond this paper. For now, I simply note: the position of
some in Europe against such mutualization—claiming that Europe is a trans-
fer union—is wrong on two counts:
(a) It exaggerates the risk of default, at least the risks of default if debt is
mutualized. At low interest rates, most of the crisis countries should have no
trouble servicing their debts.31
Of course, in the absence of debt mutualization, there is a serious risk of
partial default (which has already happened in the case of Greece). The irony
is that existing arrangements may actually lead to larger losses on the part of
creditor countries than a system of well-designed mutualization.
(b) Any system of successful economic integration must involve some as-
sistance from the stronger countries to the weaker. (The desirability of such
transfers, even in the absence of economic integration, was evidenced by the
Marshall Plan after World War II and the large debt forgiveness of Germany
by the Allies. More recently, Europe itself has provided substantial funds to
new entrants, to enable their economies to converge.)
A common financial system
The second necessary reform is a common banking system—with deposits
insured by a European-wide deposit insurance fund, and with common regu-
lations and a common approach to resolution of insolvent banks. I have al-
ready explained why a common deposit insurance fund is required: without
that, funds will flow from the banking system of “weak” countries to the
banks in strong countries, weakening further those already having problems.
                                                     
31 The exception is Greece, for which there has already been debt restructuring.
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But without a common regulatory system, a system with a common deposit
insurance scheme could be open to abuse.
But a common regulatory system should have scope for taking different
macro-prudential stances in different countries, or even regions within a
country. We described earlier how having a single Central Bank took away an
important instrument of adjustment—the interest rate. But there are a host of
other regulatory provisions (such as capital adequacy requirements) that can
be adjusted according to the macro-economic circumstances.32 Lending stan-
dards for mortgages should, for instance, be tightened at a place or time where
there appears to be the risk of a bubble forming.33
Further reforms that are desirable and perhaps even necessary if the Euro
is to survive entail a move towards tax harmonization, restricting the race to
the bottom in capital taxation, and eliminating the distortions caused by tax
competition among countries. Industrial policies that would allow those be-
hind to catch up are necessary to prevent further divergences within the coun-
tries of Europe.
Towards debt restructuring
For most Eurozone economies, these reforms would, for now, suffice. But
there may be some (like Greece) where the cumulative impact of past mis-
takes (not only their own past budgetary mistakes, but also those that were
forced on them in the early responses to the crisis) is such that more is needed.
They will have to restructure their debts.
Debt restructuring is an essential part of capitalism. Every country has a
bankruptcy law that facilitates the restructuring of debts in an orderly way.
Though after the Argentine crisis there were calls for the creation of sover-
eign-debt restructuring mechanisms, one of President Bush’s many sins was
to veto that initiative34. In the subsequent years, when there were no sover-
eign-debt crises, there was little concern about the issue. Elsewhere, I have
described what such a mechanism might look like (Stiglitz, 2010b)35. But in
the absence of such a mechanism, countries have to act on their own—as Ar-
gentina showed were possible.
                                                     
32 One of the lessons of the crisis was that monetary authorities relied excessively on interest
rates.
33 This was evidenced, for instance, by a rapid increase in housing prices relative to income, or
by an abnormally rapid expansion of credit.
34 Though a few others joined in opposition.
35 There is also need in many cases for private debt restructuring, e.g. of mortgages.  For how
this might be done, see Stiglitz and Zandi (2012) or Stiglitz (2010c).
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But if some country needs debt restructuring to enhance growth, it should
be done quickly and deeply. And one shouldn’t feel too sorry for the creditors:
lenders have been receiving high interest rates reflecting such risks.36 There is
some evidence that, on average, they are more than compensated for such
risks. By the same token, as we noted earlier, the costs to the economies doing
the restructuring may be less than widely assumed. Both theory and evidence
suggest that countries that do such restructuring can later regain access to
global financial markets, often quickly; but even if, going forward, countries
have to rely on their own savings, the adverse consequences may be far less
than the benefits they receive from the debt restructuring.37
Argentina has also shown that there is life after debt and that there are large
benefits to the reform of monetary arrangements. Indeed, there are good reasons
to believe that a deep debt restructuring will have positive benefits—providing
more fiscal space for expansionary policies, so long as the government does not
have a primary deficit. It is important that the debt write-down be deep—other-
wise, the lingering uncertainty about the possibility of another debt restructuring
will cast a pall over the recovery. And because of the uncertainty about future
growth, and therefore of debt sustainability, GDP-indexed bonds may represent
an effective form of risk-sharing (which can be thought of, at the sovereign
level, as the equivalent of the conversion of debt into equity, at the corporate
level—see Miller and Zhang, 2013, and Griffith-Jones, 2013).
The end of the Euro?
The analysis of this paper has suggested that prospects for the 17-nation
Eurozone’s survival, in its current form, are bleak. Its end, as was its creation,
is as much a matter of politics as economics. European leaders continually
affirm their commitment to do what is required to sustain it; but at the same
time, key European leaders have shown that they do not seem to understand
what is required to sustain it, and have ruled out many of the necessary meas-
ures. They have continually repeated a mantra—that one has to restore confi-
dence and grow the economy—as they have put forth measures that have un-
dermined long-term confidence and have put the economy into recession.
Even when most European leaders seem to have eventually grasped what is
required, there are two overriding snags: can they achieve the unanimity re-
quired, given differences in the perspectives, interests and politics in the differ-
ent countries; and can they achieve the requisite agreements fast enough?
                                                     
36 Or they should have done so, had they done their due diligence.
37 As the paper by Sandleris (2012) points out, the costs may be less related to those imposed
externally, and more related to failures of the government to deal effectively with the inter-
nal disturbances associated with debt restructuring, e.g., to the financial system (banking, in-
surance, and pensions).
30 Ekonomi-tek Volume / Cilt: 2  No: 1  January / Ocak 2013
The incongruence between the pace of markets and that of the politics
could present a separate problem for the survival of the Euro. Indeed, the slow
pace at which the fundamental cracks in the system are being addressed is
already causing problems: the financial sector in the crisis countries continues
to be weakened, both as austerity exerts its toll on the individual economy and
as capital flees that country. This means that the magnitude of the assistance
that eventually may be required is likely to be far greater than it would have
been had the reforms been undertaken earlier.38
Many European leaders have recognized that eventually a single banking
framework, with common regulations, deposit insurance, and resolution, will
be necessary. But others argue that such a dramatic reform must be done care-
fully, in a step-by-step process. First, there must be common regulations, and
when the regulatory system has been “proven,” Europe can go on to the next
stage(s). Were there not an ongoing crisis, such an argument would have some
merit. But those with capital in, say, the Spanish banks will not wait: the
benefits of waiting are nil, the risks are substantial. And so, while European
leaders dither, the banking system will be weakened.
ECB lending (in the unlimited amounts promised, provided that the country
requests it and subjects itself to conditionality) may delay the day of reckoning.
But one should be clear that the issue facing, say, the Spanish banks is not just
one of liquidity. If the funds are accompanied by the austerity conditionality
that has marked earlier programs, unaccompanied by any program that would
lead to growth, then the banks will continue to get weaker; and even the antici-
pation that this might be so will contribute to funds leaving the banks. What is
necessary for a return of “confidence” in the banking system is (a) a belief that
further losses will be limited; and (b) the government has the resources and
willingness to rescue the bank, should it run into problems. But under current
policies, not only are the banks’ losses likely to continue to mount, each gov-
ernment’s ability to rescue its banks will continue to deteriorate.
Alternatively, those with funds in Spanish banks might be willing to keep
their funds there, were they confident that Europe will step into the breach.
But Europe’s equivocation has not helped, a timorousness stoked by Northern
Europe’s attempts to limit its exposure, in response to domestic political pres-
sures. After recognizing in the summer of 2012 that the “bootstrap” approach
would not work, and that Europe’s support would have to go directly to the
banks, there appears (as this paper goes to press) to be some backtracking—
perhaps the legacy “debts” will not be covered. After recognizing that there
                                                     
38 The slow pace of reforms has led to other problems: Ireland, one of the first countries to
receive assistance, is concerned that later countries will get a better “deal.”
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needs to be a common financial framework, again there appears to be some
backtracking: perhaps only the large banks should be included. (While the
failure of a single small bank would not itself cause large systemic effects
throughout Europe, the failure of a number of small banks could; and what is
at stake is not just the “systemic risk” of Europe’s financial system, but the
capacity of the Spanish banking system to provide credit, especially to SMEs,
and this credit may be even more dependent on the strength of the smaller
banks than on that of the larger banks.)
There is likely to be turmoil in the process of the restructuring of the Euro-
zone, and the resulting downturn could be significant. But under the current
regime, the prospects for crisis countries are truly bleak: for some, depression
as far as the eye can see. Europe has offered no alternative vision.
The current regime is also undermining the legitimacy of democratic eco-
nomic institutions. The European project was a top-down initiative. There was
a very short period of prosperity39—based in some countries on access to
credit at irrationally low interest rates. The promises of sustained prosperity
were not delivered upon. The rules of the game not only failed to deliver on
sustained macro-economic growth, they also have led to widening inequality,
with governments restrained in their ability to redress growing inequities.
Evidently, the elites created a system that seems to have done well for those at
the top.
In many quarters, there is concern about the ceding of effective economic
power—originally to Brussels’ bureaucrats, but increasingly to German poli-
ticians, undermining national democracies.
There are a variety of ways by which the current form of the Eurozone
might end. There was, of course, in its creation the assumption that it would
never end (though monetary arrangements have frequently had to be
changed), and so there was no provision for contingencies similar to that
which the Eurozone is now facing. It might end by the ECB refusing to dis-
count the bills of the banks of a member country—in effect, ceasing to act as a
Central Bank for that country, and forcing the country’s old Central Bank to
resume that role. Or it might end in a popular uprising against the continued
depression forced on the crisis countries by Europe’s leaders.
However the breakup of the Euro occurs, it is likely to be costly. Never-
theless, there are several options for reducing those costs. There is growing
agreement among economists that the least costly form of break-up would
entail Germany leaving the Euro. The New Euro (so defined) would almost
                                                     
39 Monetary arrangements often have a short life span—witness the ERM.  Even the Bretton
Woods system (fixed exchange rates) lasted less than three decades.
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surely depreciate relative to the Mark, correcting current-account imbalances
within Europe, strengthening growth in crisis countries, and enabling those
countries to more easily meet their debt obligations.
At the same time, the stronger Mark would enable Germany to easily meet
its debt obligations. Some creditors might feel that they were being cheated,
being paid back in the depreciated (New) Euro; but credit contracts are typi-
cally unindexed, and there are a host of contingencies that affect the real value
of what is repaid. Creditors receive a risk premium for bearing those risks.
Whatever happens has distributive consequences; other ways of having the
Eurozone dissolved entail adverse effects on borrowers.
7. Concluding Comments
Most crises are manmade. They are not caused by famines or other natural
disasters. They are often the result of unstable market processes—not a sud-
den change in government policies. On the other hand, government policies
can affect the likelihood of the occurrence of crises and their consequences.
Government policies can affect countries’ exposure to risk and the structural
stability of the system as well as impede or facilitate adjustments. The elimi-
nation of automatic stabilizers, and their replacement in some cases by auto-
matic destabilizers, has introduced new instabilities into the economic system.
Deregulation and financial and capital-market liberalization have provided
new opportunities for destabilizing market processes and opened up new
channels by which the instabilities in one country can affect others (Delli
Gatti et al., 2006).
We have seen how institutional changes surrounding the Eurozone—in-
tended to create a more stable and prosperous economy—played out in ways
that were, at the time of the founding of the Euro, largely unanticipated, but
which—at least in hindsight— were totally understandable given the struc-
tural flaws in the Eurozone institutional arrangement. We have seen, too, how
the policy responses to the crisis, as it unfolded have, in many cases, only
made matters worse.
There are alternative policies that would enhance stability and, should a
crisis occur, be more likely to restore the economy to prosperity. But to adopt
these policies, one has to break out of the ideological straitjacket of market
fundamentalism/neo-liberalism and much of conventional economics.
There was no sudden change in the underlying state variables describing
the European economy, no war that wiped out large portions of its physical
and human capital stock, not even an innovation or an economic transforma-
tion that would have led to rapid obsolescence of its capital stock. There have,
of course, been sudden changes in expectations, and in our understandings:
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we know (or at least we should now know) that markets are not necessarily
quickly self-correcting, that under-regulated markets can give rise to bubbles
and credit excesses, that Greece or Spain having the same currency as Ger-
many does not mean that Greek or Spanish debt is as safe as that of Germany,
and it may not even fully eliminate exchange-rate risk and, in ways that we
have explained, may actually increase default risk.
Crises are complex events, and it is inevitably overly simplistic to find a
single-causal explanation. Still, it should be clear that the Euro crisis, like so
many other crises, is more attributable to market excesses than to government
profligacy. If government is to be blamed, it is for a failure to tame the (re-
peated) market excesses. (And even when there is government profligacy, the
market is almost always a co-conspirator—lending excessively at easy terms,
in its irrational optimism about the prospects of repayment.) Prevention en-
tails understanding how to curb the excesses, and how to design institutional
arrangements that limit the opportunity for such excesses. Resolution entails
understanding how to ensure that, after a crisis, resources are put back to use
as quickly as possible.
With or without such excesses, economies are exposed to shocks; different
institutional arrangements heighten the exposure to such shocks, amplify the
effects, make the effects more persistent, and impede adjustment afterward.
Market forces by themselves may not only lead to endogenous disturbances
(like bubbles), but may respond to shocks in a destabilizing way. Government
intervention (e.g., through debt restructuring, countercyclical macro-policies,
and well designed bank recapitalizations) can reduce the enormous costs that
have traditionally been associated with crises.
Crises are perhaps an inherent feature of capitalism. But they do not have
to be as frequent, as deep, and as costly as they have been.
The standard macro-economic models ignored history—which had shown
that capitalism had been marked by large fluctuations, with great suffering,
since the start. The models equally ignored key market failures that help ex-
plain persistent inefficiencies and instabilities. In doing so, policymakers us-
ing those models may have violated the central principle of Hippocrates: do
no harm. he policies and institutional arrangements based on these simplistic
models and theories created the pre-conditions for these crises and have con-
tributed to the slow recovery from this Great Recession—a downturn that,
while not as deep as the Great Depression, may begin to rival it in duration.
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